

## 1 *Introductory Remarks*

It is obvious that one must look farther than changes in the state of higher education, research and scholarship to conceive what AKU should aim to be in 2020. We must consider changes in the political map, in the economies of nations, and in the meaning and boundaries of those “developing” and “Muslim” worlds we have been confidently referring to. It is clear that we must reflect on ideological and cultural movements that affect universities, their students and teachers, and what is studied and taught in them.

Some of the major changes since 1983 stand out in glaring prominence. The collapse of the USSR and its empire in Eastern Europe has brought consequences so numerous and profound that we grope to appreciate them. Where once the bipolarity of the Cold War made the rest of the world a “Third World” in which Great Powers contended, we must now ask if that convenient term is still proper to use. And recognising that “development” has been an ideology coloured by the competition of East and West, we must look afresh at its meaning and future.

Changes that affect the countries and regions of particular interest to AKU deserve the special attention which we give them before surveying wider changes in the developing and Muslim worlds.

## 2 *Changes and Prospects in Central Asia, East Africa and Pakistan*

### 2.1 *Central Asia*

Some of the effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union are very concrete and of direct interest to the Aga Khan Development Network (including AKU). The dissolution brought a group of **Central Asian areas** out onto the international stage as the independent countries of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, with all except Kazakhstan having clear Muslim majorities in their populations. The Muslim world has thus been politically extended and new international relations have grown. The Aga Khan Trust for Culture has been engaged in a historic preservation project in Samarkand and the 1992 presentation of the Aga Khan Awards in

Architecture was held there. Tajikistan has been of particular interest, since it has a substantial Ismaili population. This was a part of the Soviet Union heavily dependent on support from elsewhere in the Union; it is the poorest of these Central Asia republics and its Ismaili population has been concentrated in Gorno-Badakhshan, the poorest part of the country. There has been a diminution or cessation of support from the ex-USSR and the civil war that broke out in 1992 led to massacres and refugee flights of Ismailis and others. Since this Ismaili population has been in grave need of assistance, the Aga Khan Foundation has been active in relief work. The report from a November 1993 mission of the Foundation says that the AKF emergency programme was then feeding the entire 242,000 population of Gorno-Badakhshan, using support from USAID, the European Community, and other sources. Looking beyond immediate relief needs, the AKF mission explored fields of possible AKF activities in this new country that is bound to be of continuing interest to the Aga Khan and the Ismaili Jamat. Since there are presently few domestic resources to sustain Tajikistan's well-developed educational and health systems that previously depended on Union resources, there is abundant potential for AKF activity. How extensively and rapidly such activity may develop is not something we can presently judge, but when and as it does, connections or points of interest for AKU may be expected to follow. We learn that a student for the first group in the Institute for Educational Development has been brought from Tajikistan. There is also a fledgling university in Khorog, a city of about 40,000 people in Gorno-Badakhshan, established after the civil war drove teachers and students back to their home territory. The needs of this struggling institution have attracted His Highness' attention and he has suggested that some sort of firm and lasting relationship between it and AKU should be developed.

The withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan has also brought a potential addition to the countries of interest to the Aga Khan institutions. Whatever the ultimate resolution of the agonising civil war that continues to divide and ravage the country, it will clearly be a Muslim country, and one with a significant and needy Ismaili population.

## 2.2 Africa, in Particular East Africa

Other changes since 1983 in parts of the world that have had particular interest for the Aga Khan Development Network and hence for AKU, have occurred in Africa. The Harvard Report recommended that a branch of AKU be established in Kenya as one of the first steps in its internationalisation. Though the recommendation was ultimately not followed, there was serious consideration of it, with the start of a feasibility study and explorations with Kenyan authorities. During the past decade, political instability and economic deterioration in Africa have given the continent a dismaying image, and made this Commission question seriously if a move of AKU into Africa would be a promising early step after Karachi.

It is not easy to be optimistic about a reversal of Africa's fortunes in the period we are looking ahead. *The Economist*, analysing the latest World Bank study in March 1994, found :

*"The most dispiriting thing about Africa is not that it is the world's poorest continent; nor even that it is the only one where people were poorer at the end of the 1980s than they had been at the start. It is that even if its economy (minus South Africa) were to grow at the rate confidently projected by the World Bank for the rest of the 1990s, Africans would have to wait another 40 years to clamber back to the incomes they had in the mid-1970s. Exclude Nigeria, and the wait would last a century."*  
[March 5, p.21]

The maintenance of a stable democratic political system in such dispiriting conditions - or even a benevolently authoritarian one - would be difficult, even without the existence of other sources of governmental weakness in Africa. And, of course, **bad government or plain anarchy have accelerated and deepened economic disasters** in Uganda, Zaire, Somalia, Rwanda, and at least half-a dozen other African countries one might catalogue. Robert D. Kaplan in a widely influential article, "The Coming Anarchy" [*The Atlantic Monthly*, (Boston), February, 1994] takes conditions in West Africa as ominous harbingers of the future for much of the developing world. Using Sierra Leone as a microcosm he depicts "the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war".

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The Southern Sudan, Liberia, Somalia and Rwanda have now made the world conscious that the failure to maintain domestic peace, law and order may be a graver threat to Africa's future than economic weakness. The example of Zaire, however, reminds us that even without extended civil war, mismanagement can lead to destruction of a national economy in a vicious downward spiral of economic crisis and disorder. Kenneth Noble of the New York Times recently reported from Lubumbashi, the city of 800,000 people in the heart of Zaire's copper mining area, on the deterioration of that once rich industry. [His headline was "Zaire's Rich Mines are Abandoned to Scavengers" Monday, February, 21, 1994, p.A3] The story may serve better than generalities to display the destructive potential of mismanagement and disorder.

There was awareness more than a decade ago that replacement of ageing mining and smelting equipment was needed. In the late 1980s, a \$ 702 million investment plan with funding from IBRD, the African Development Bank and the European Community fell through, reportedly because of diversion of funds to pay the army in the Shaba province and to pay for railway and river transport. In October 1991, four days of looting and burning by unpaid soldiers wrecked much of Lubumbashi downtown and shut down virtually all mining operations. Dozens were killed. In spring, 1992, there was more unrest, with the flight of most of the French and Belgian expatriate mining technicians, as well as Greek and Lebanese merchants. An estimated 6,000 foreigners fled in 1991 and 1992 and very few returned. In fall, 1992, ethnic fighting broke out between people from Kasai province and the local Katangans. Tens of thousands of people from Kasai "who had formed the managerial cores of Gecamines [the national mining company] were virtually expelled from the region in a wave of xenophobic fervour by the Katangans". In 1992 Zaire still earned \$ 270 million from exports of copper and cobalt. In the first eight months of 1993, it earned only \$ 68 million, and the story ends with scavengers looking for pieces of scrap copper to hawk.

The future of East Africa is, of course, of particular concern to AKDN and to the possibilities for AKU. Our Secretary made a visit there this past June, to refresh his acquaintance after several years' absence, and to help the Commission make judgements about the probable

future. [A Report on this 1-4 June visit was prepared for the use of the Commission.] Mr. Sutton found reminders that the area looks better now than it did in the late 1980s when Tanzania was stagnant, Uganda just out of the civil war, and Ethiopia still under the brutal Mengistu. There was surprising optimism about Uganda's encouraging recovery even though it has far to rise from the effects of Idi Amin's and Milton Obote's disasters; Tanzania shows some stirrings of progress though it remains as desperately poor as Ethiopia or Sudan without having had as bloody a history as theirs. Kenya's international reputation has suffered in recent years from its runaway population growth, governmental repression and corruption, and crime in its capital. But it remains distinctly better off than its impoverished neighbours, has avoided major disasters, and has recently shown such promising changes as a successful campaign to reduce fertility, better control of external balances and the budget deficit (under IMF-IBRD discipline), and even some easing of constraints on the political opposition. For all the troubles and disappointments of recent years, Kenya remains relatively stable and promising, Uganda continues its heartening recovery, and Tanzania under more promising policies shows hopeful signs of progress.

If we accept The Economist's and the World Bank's projections, these East African countries will remain extremely poor to 2020 and beyond. Their needs for economic development, education, health services and the elementary necessities of human dignity will remain enormous. The failures of national governments in meeting these needs have brought new policies of privatisation and an unplanned proliferation of private efforts of many kinds. The demands on the AKDN's network of health and educational institutions in East Africa are now heavy and will not diminish in the foreseeable future. There will be many ways in which AKU can assist and complement these institutions whether or not it establishes a branch in East Africa. **These potentials will assure a serious concern with East Africa in the AKU of the future and will exert a significant influence on its development.**

Whether conditions will be such that AKU will have good chances for rewarding efforts in East Africa depends on political conditions that are harder to extrapolate than figures on GDP per head. It is easy to be pessimistic, and to turn away

from African problems as many, discouraged by seemingly endless strife and disorder, now do. It is obviously necessary for AKU to be prudent and to avoid unnecessary hazards, but it is **hardly possible to envisage a future for AKU in the developing world that would be immune to serious hazards**. The greatest threats to its future lie in the political extremes of breakdown of order in war and civil strife on the one hand, and authoritarian repression on the other. The general record in Africa has not been heartening but there are areas that promise brighter futures than others, and East Africa may be among them. Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania were once linked in a network of East African institutions and recent trends toward open, market economies encourage a revival of regional ties that may counter the forces of narrow nationalism, with beneficial effects on both economic and political development. Receptivity to international institutions promises to be greater in such contexts of regional openness, with obvious encouragement for the future treatment of AKDN, including AKU.

We have not ventured a comprehensive review assessing the political future of East Africa generally, but our Secretary's recent visit in Nairobi stimulated a special effort on Kenya. Because of its relative openness, Kenya is one of the African countries better known to its own and other scholars and journalists. A plausible political future for the country (well beyond the probable duration of the present government) can be discerned in their writings.<sup>6</sup> Kenya has a substantial African bourgeoisie that would suffer badly by a breakdown of order and as such is a conservative force. There are grave inequalities of wealth and income in the country that have fuelled political movements in the past and will undoubtedly do so in the future. Such movements build around populist leaders hostile to private institutions and international influences who would presumably not be favourable to an institution like AKU. Kenya also has the tribalism or ethnic sub-nationalism that challenges the coherence and stability of African states; and students of African politics have found here as elsewhere the disposition to personalised and clientelistic politics that make favouritism and corruption endemic constraints on stability and good government in Africa. But these normal impedimenta of African politics have thus far been managed without serious breakdowns in Kenya;

and the rise of a more educated populace with a growing, if limited, experience of democracy and a necessary international openness (exemplified in a devotion to English) promises a gradual amelioration of the conditions for good government.

The Commission has been encouraged by His Highness not merely to counsel prudence but to seek ways in which AKU and other universities may contribute to better governance of Muslim and other developing societies. Keeping in mind that the presence or influence of AKU in Africa may have such value, we have entertained as optimistic views on probable political futures there as good sense would allow.

### 2.3 *Pakistan*

Our observations on changes since 1983 lead naturally to reflections on changes in **Pakistan**. It is obvious that the most serious threat to the future of the Aga Khan University would be a breakdown of the political and security conditions which have hitherto made it able to function freely in Karachi. Short of a major disruption, unsatisfactory or deteriorating conditions in the country and city can and will make AKU's functioning more difficult. AKU's vocation as an international university has given the Commission reasons to contemplate the establishment of new components of the University in countries other than Pakistan. But it has also found itself repeatedly facing questions of comparative advantage in a location close to AKUMC and IED in Karachi as against some distant location. Such judgements have regularly required assessing how likely Karachi would be an attractive place for the Pakistanis and expatriates who would need to be recruited. And such assessments naturally widen into others of economic and political sorts.

Pakistan has certainly not done badly in economic terms since our benchmark date of 1983. Its average growth of GNP per capita over the period 1980-1992 has been a firmly positive 3.1%, about the same as India's and far better than most of the low income economies, except for China's extraordinary 7.6% and Indonesia's 4.0%. In some recent years, Pakistan made remarkable gains. As ex-Senator Charles Percy wrote in the Winter, 1992-1993, issue of *Foreign Affairs*,

<sup>6</sup> Principal sources used here were the essays, by Kenyans and others, in ed. Michael G. Schatzberg, *The Political Economy of Kenya*, Praeger, 1988, and eds. Goren Hyden and Michael Bratton, *Government and Politics in Africa*, Riemer, 1992.

“In 1991 [Pakistan] had the highest growth rate in South Asia at 6.5%. Many state enterprises have been privatised although not at the anticipated rate, and a number of major infrastructure projects are under way, including desperately needed power plants.” The tables in the World Bank’s Development Reports show that the economy has progressively diversified in the period 1965-90 with the value of agricultural production going down from 40% to 26% of the total while there were corresponding gains in industry, manufacturing and services. Agricultural production almost trebled in value between 1970 and 1990 although production per capita did not improve in the 1980s (where as it increased 19% in India and 33% in China).

In other respects, changes in Pakistan are less reassuring. The Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Program, which combines GNP per capita, expectation of life at birth and literacy level, showed Pakistan sliding to the 120th position in 1990, despite good progress in GNP per capita. Life expectancy at birth in 1992 was 59 years, the same as Kenya’s and below India’s 61. In the period 1980-1992, Pakistan’s annual rate of population growth was 3.1%, a figure now very high in Asian comparisons, with, e.g., India at 2.1%, Bangladesh at 2.3%, and Indonesia at 1.8%. While corresponding figures for other Asian countries show more modest rises, the World Bank projects the population of Pakistan growing from 119 million in 1992 to 148 million in 2000 and 243 million in 2025 and with a “hypothetical stationary population” of 400 million. The high rate of population growth is an important contributor to the explosive growth of the urban population at 4.5% per annum. Pakistan’s population was 33% urbanised in 1992 and at these rates would reach 50% in a little over 30 years. To round off this catalogue of discouraging figures, we must note that Pakistan has always looked bad in international educational comparisons and continues to do so with only 46% of the primary school age population in school in 1991 and only 31% of the female children.

The implications of these various figures for the future of Pakistan must be traced through their interaction with the political and environmental situations of the country. As in other developing countries, internal divisions and

animosities, and the pressures of needs and demands from a swelling population, make the tasks of government difficult. We cannot here undertake to trace the political history of Pakistan since 1983 but two general points may be made. One is that suggested by Senator Percy’s remark in the article cited above: “Pakistan’s political instability will provide the biggest obstacle to effective economic reform ...” and hence in Percy’s and others’ views, to economic growth. The other is that the years since 1983 have not seen tensions with India diminish, and with them the dangers of actual warfare; on the contrary, during the life of this Commission, the conflict over Kashmir and the after-effects of the Ayodhya assault have not only brought serious fears of strife, but pessimistic doubt that the high levels of security expenditures on both sides can soon be reduced and more funds made available to ease the deficiencies set forth in the statistics above.

The problems of security for Pakistan are both external and internal, and AKU at its locations in Karachi sits in the midst of one of the more serious internal problems. Like other great cities of the Third World, Karachi has grown enormously and precipitously to its current total of more than 10 million people. It has the usual litany of urban problems in housing, sanitation and basic services for a largely poor population with widespread unemployment. The population is ethnically diverse too, with Mohajirs (Urdu-speaking migrants from India), Sindhis, Pathans, Punjabis and others engaged in political and other rivalries. The crime that afflicts major cities over much of the world has reached very troublesome levels in Karachi in the last decade. Both it and political conflicts have become more violent since the war in Afghanistan brought a flood of weapons into the country. The general political situation in Sindh has been such that international observers have seen “anarchy spreading” since the execution of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1979, [The Economist, May 30, 1992] with continuing strife between a Mohajir political movement and the Pakistan People’s Party, now headed by Bhutto’s daughter, Benazir. The deterioration of order led to army rule in Sindh in May, 1992. It is still in effect but without saving Karachi from levels of criminal, political, and religious violence that led The Economist in the heat and power failures of this past summer to declare a “Requiem for Karachi”. [August 13, 1994, pp.33-34].

Despite its grave troubles, Karachi remains economically vigorous and essential to the future of Pakistan. Any government of Pakistan must seek to "save" Karachi, as Benazir Bhutto is now proclaiming it will. The future of Karachi is thus organically connected with the future of effective government in Pakistan. These are futures that will worsen or brighten together but short of a devastating war with India are not likely to run into disaster together. One easily hears talk of the drift of talent and wealth from Karachi and Sindh to the Punjab, and the possibility exists that Karachi may show relative decline even in a generally prospering Pakistan. Such an evolution would not be good for AKU but it would be much less troublesome than a persistence of the present insecurity of the city. That insecurity hurts the country at large and we must hope that the efforts of government to diminish it will be successful over the coming decades. It is, of course, rooted in social, economic, and environmental problems for some of which AKU has already shown a vocation.

Being in the midst of Karachi and its problems, AKU is well-placed to fulfil some of its missions for the developing and Muslim worlds. But it has always been thought that it needed to spread elsewhere to fulfil the vision at its founding; the history of the last decade would seem to underscore the wisdom of that judgement.

### 3 *The Changing State and Meaning of the "Developing World"*

The changes in the world since the Harvard Report was written in the early 1980s have not only broken down the old division of First, Second and Third Worlds; they have shaken the division of the world into "developed" and "developing" countries that has been a fundamental basis of international relations since World War II. The U.S. ambassador gave a vivid expression of changed views when he said bluntly at the 1990 special session of the UN General Assembly on International Economic Co-operation that his country did not wish to continue the development debates of the last three decades and had only agreed to participate in the Special Session with "a great deal of reserve and with very considerable scepticism" [UN Development Forum May-June 1990, pp.1,17]. The U.S. is not alone among the rich countries in this fatigue with the classic

conceptions of mutual responsibility between developed and developing countries. Since the 1970s, enthusiasm for development assistance has declined and a readiness appeared to criticise mismanagement and abuses of human rights in the developing countries, replacing earlier indulgence for them.

The developing countries have been less disposed to abandon the familiar basic conceptions but have had to face a **breakdown of the simple classification of developed and developing countries**. This breakdown began in earnest with the explosion of oil prices in 1973, and the emergence of very rich but still underdeveloped countries. The East Asian tiger cubs began rapid growth in that decade and brought new faith in open, export-oriented economies, a faith that the popularity of Thatcherite-Reaganite doctrines in the Western world amplified during the 1980s. By the late 1980s, the authors of the IBRD's World Development Reports and economists like Paul Krugman had to have four or five sub-classifications of what had previously been simply "developing" countries. They had to recognise quite different records of economic growth and different relationships to the world economy.

The **differential records** of success, stagnation and decline across world regions have become more pronounced, with East and South East Asia rising impressively, South Asia growing only modestly, Africa in alarming decline, and Latin America struggling through debt burdens to a recent upward turn. On the other hand, a **growing uniformity of economic ideology** has become evident, with socialism in discredit and its past consequences reversed in privatisations as doctrines of open market economies became triumphant. As usual, there have been disputes over the importance of public policy in determining the differences in economic progress, with the weight of criticism falling on governments that restricted the play of market forces. But the much studied record of East Asian successes shows no simple correlation between laissez-faire governmental policies and these successes. The result has been groping for explanations in such things as a "Confucian mentality", the "East Asian developmental state" of some political economists, or even in the moralising of Prime Minister Mahatir or Lee Kuan Yew.

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**The impact of this newly complicated picture of development and the “developing world” has been felt within this Commission.** We have heard reflections on the differential progress of Muslim countries and those in or touched by the Confucian traditions. It seems fair to assume that such reflections are not idiosyncratic to our membership, and express ideas that are now widely present in Muslim countries. But until very recently Pakistan’s record of economic growth has been better than that of non-Muslim South Asia neighbours, and some of the South East Asian stars are predominately Muslim countries. But the disquieting thought that many Muslim countries are making slow progress out of poverty not simply because they share the common difficulties of underdevelopment but because their heritage is not as helpful as some other heritages - and these definitely not Western - may now be growing among Muslims. It may point to an enlivened interest in analysis of the distinctive development problems of Muslim societies.

In a broader view, such considerations are an example of the **interplay of culture and development** which has won increasing attention among those who try to puzzle out what causes some nations to prosper while others flounder. There once was a time when there was strong faith in general theories of economic development applicable to all poor nations. By the 1980s, the existence of a distinctive economics for the developing countries was disputed and its “statist” heritage denounced by the head of USAID and by World Bank economists. When the Harvard Report was written, its authors were conscious of difficult unsolved problems of development policy and management; hence one of the Harvard Committee’s major recommendations. The triumph of free-market orthodoxies since 1983 has not yet provided universal solutions to development problems, as differential successes and failures show. The Commission has been impressed that these problems of finding the way to better lives and national futures in the developing countries remain among the most challenging questions facing humanity.

**Service to the developing nations and their generic problems has been a cardinal aim of AKU.** We must ask if the growing variety in developing countries and changing attitudes toward them should change AKU’s declared

vocation toward them in the future. We think not, both for ethical and intellectual reasons. Despite a remarkable record of progress over the years since everyone began to talk about “development”, there remain a billion human beings in dehumanising poverty, and these people are overwhelmingly in the developing countries. The World Bank can open its 1993 Development Report with a reminder that “Over the past forty years life expectancy has improved more than during the entire previous span of human history”, but then must go on to doleful recitation of preventable deaths in the developing countries. Parts of the developing world may be climbing rapidly toward international middle-class standards, but in the stretch of geography from South East Asia to Africa that must remain of particular interest to AKU, 2020 will not see the end of “absolute” poverty and the ills that go with it.

**The ethical impulse to maintain AKU’s commitment to the “generic problems of development” is reinforced by the intellectual challenges sketched above.** There have been successes in development but understanding how it occurs and how best it is fostered has not become easier. It remains full of intellectual challenges for AKU as an institution devoted to higher education and research.

As we shall emphasise in Section V below where we review AKU’s position in the network of Aga Khan institutions, the impact of AKU’s work on problems of development will be amplified if it can continue to work with international assistance programmes. Looking to the future, we must worry if the rather sour postures toward development assistance in the U.S., Germany, and other countries presage early and sharp decline. In a paper for a USAID sponsored conference in 1992, Mr. Sutton concluded that the U.S. and other foreign aid programmes would be maintained, at least for the decade of the 1990s. [“The World of the 90s” pp.16 ff.] The reasons he saw were essentially two : (1) the political and security uses of foreign aid; (2) the eleemosynary disposition that has always been significant motivation in development assistance and continues in response to disasters and extreme deprivation. The Third World instabilities that brought the Gulf War in 1992, and that have brought Rwandan massacres and North Korean tensions as these lines are

written show little prospect of diminishing. They seem to assure continuing commitments of the rich countries to foreign aid support despite reluctant citizenries and legislators. What the forms and quality of that support may be will be important to the prospects of future resources for AKU's programmes and we will return to the subject when we look at these prospects [Section VIII below].

#### 4 *Changes in the Muslim World*

There have not only been changes in the categorisation of the world into developed and developing nations since 1983. The meaning and character of the "Muslim world" have changed too. It is, of course, not obvious how one should define a "Muslim world". There are said to be approximately one billion Muslims in the world at the present time. The *Encyclopaedia Britannica 1993 Book of the Year* distributes this total by areas as follows :

Africa	278,000,000
Asia	636,976,000
Europe	12,574,500
Latin America	1,350,500
North America	2,847,000
Oceania	100,500
Former USSR	39,229,400
World Total	971,077,900

Some of these numbers are suspiciously precise and some are disputed (e.g., the U.S. Muslim community claims 6 million in the U.S. alone) but the distribution is instructive. One notes the considerable Muslim population in Europe, some long established as in the Balkans, some a result of fairly recent immigration from North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. With the North American population these Muslims in Europe remind us that the "Muslim world" is more than a subset of the developing world. The concentration of the major Muslim populations in Africa and Asia also means that the world Muslim population will be growing impressively between now and 2020. The sheer growth of population assures major extension of the numbers of Muslims. The tables we have assembled in Appendix D on the countries of Asia and Africa with significant Muslim populations show, e.g., the Muslim population of

West Africa growing from some 95 million at the beginning of the 1990s to about 225 million by 2025, while the Muslims of East Africa are growing from 67 to 157 million. Assuming that they keep the same proportions in the total population that they have now, there will be half again as many African Muslims in 2025 as there were Africans of all sorts in 1950. In this demographic sense the Muslim world will have an impressive, even enormous, expansion over the next 25 or 30 years. Most of this expansion will be in parts of the world that are relatively poor and some of which are, at present, becoming relatively poorer. The future Muslim world may have more feelings of relative deprivation than it does now.

A large part of the world's Muslim population lives in countries where Muslims are not in the majority. But there is a natural disposition, despite the huge Muslim minority in India, to think of the Muslim majority states as making up the "Muslim world". Some of these countries, like Pakistan, Mauritania, or Iran, are officially "Islamic Republics"; though Bangladesh is a "Peoples' Republic", Indonesia is simply a "Republic", Saudi Arabia is a "Kingdom" and Qatar flatly the "State of Qatar". Some countries with predominately Muslim populations like Turkey or Iraq have had clearly or even aggressively secular governments and dominant ideologies.

The diversity in Muslim majority countries remains great but we are all aware that there has been a rise of Islamic movements both activist and pietistic in recent decades, which have had profound effects on the political, social and intellectual life in the Muslim world, and indeed, beyond it. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 antedated the Harvard Report, as did the assassination of Sadat, the rising in Hama and its brutal suppression. The Report was much concerned about the limitations it then saw on the academic study of matters involving Islam within Muslim countries, and its recommendation of a Centre of Research in the Social Sciences and Humanities devoted to the Muslim world specified that this Centre "must be located in the Western world". But the Report did not dwell on challenges presented by "radical" or "fundamentalist" movements in the Muslim world. This Commission could hardly avoid doing so.



An immense amount of attention is now given by public figures, the media, and scholars to Islamic movements. The Western world may remain oblivious of Egyptian Islamist papers that, as *The Economist* says, would have nothing to write about if they gave up attacking the West and its sins. But the fanatic terrorists who nearly brought down one of New York City's proud towers, Khomeini's death sentence on Salman Rushdie, and currently the demands in Bangladesh for the death of Taslima Nasrin have made front-page news around the world. The contrast to the state of discussion of the Middle East and other predominately Muslim areas as recently as 1970 is quite remarkable. [For example, the Ford Foundation conducted a major review of its Middle East programmes in the early 1970s and, seeking guidance on the future of the area, commissioned numerous papers from leading authorities; their papers contained hardly more than passing mention of the Muslim Brotherhood or other Islamic movements.] Scholars like Clifford Geertz or Emmanuel Sivan have maintained that the phenomena now so abundantly discussed (and so carelessly described as "fundamentalist") have had long historical roots. Nevertheless, they had a sudden rise to prominence beginning about 1975. There may have been for a time a disposition to treat Khomeini and the Iranian revolution as unique. But the spread of similar movements in Sunni lands, now dramatically expressed in the challenges to the secular governments of Algeria and Egypt, has made evident that a powerful and widespread movement has been underway.

It seems clear that AKU now faces a more challenging vocation as a Muslim university than it faced in 1983. There is now a more urgent need for presentations of Islam that correct the distorted versions presented by extremists. (This was an evident motivation of the Jordanian university described earlier.) These extremists' aggressive denunciation of other Muslims as idolaters or apostates has undoubtedly diminished awareness of variety that has existed among committed and pious Muslims.

As we look ahead trying to envisage what AKU should be in 2020 or 2025, we must try to judge how lasting and profound this recent upsurge

of Islamic movements may be. There have been persisting arguments over the secular or transitory nature of these movements since they first attracted widespread attention, and it is sometimes difficult to interpret the course of events. For example, Prof. Barbara Metcalfe, a leading American scholar of South Asia, has traced a progressive triumph of Islamic over secular bases of legitimacy for the Pakistani state; but last year's national elections brought a sharp decline of the Islamic parties. A secure sense of the durability or transitoriness of the upsurge of militant extremist movements must rest on some analysis of its origins.

The principled opposition of the activist Islamic movements to the Western world, its values and modes of personal behaviour has been one of their strongest themes. It has fed responses like Samuel Huntington's discernment of a "clash of civilisations" (a view quickly challenged by Fouad Ajami, Kishore Mahbubani and others).<sup>7</sup> The antipathy of militant Islamic movements to the states in Muslim countries that were built on Western models has likewise been profound. These reactions seem related to frustrations over failures and disappointments at the benefits brought by modern secular knowledge and institutions. The decades following World War II were decades of enthusiasm and optimism about the possibilities of rapid development. As Francophone African leaders used to say, even very poor and backward countries aimed to "partir en flèche", and many governments assumed responsibility for trying to do so. Historically unprecedented progress was in fact made in most places until the early 1970s. Thereafter, there was slowing for a while followed by the differentials of successes and disappointments of the last years. For even the more successful countries, there have been disparities between expectations and accomplishments, and over much of the developing world, the performance of governments has been seen as disappointing, or worse, as corrupt and incompetent. Recourse to private initiative and organisation in many forms both secular and religious have been a natural response. Religious organisations, not only Islamic, but Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, and various syncretistic ones as well, have absorbed aspirations and assumed social functions.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993 for Huntington's original article; the responses mentioned appeared in the following September/October issue.

Retrospectively, it is easy to see reasons for the upsurge of religious movements over much of the world in the 1970s.<sup>8</sup> They were not, however, clearly anticipated at the time and we may wonder how prescient we may be about their force and prevalence in 2020 or 2025. The possibility of a new era of optimistic confidence in the powers of modern secular knowledge and technology is not altogether to be excluded. But prospects of the South Asian and African countries that are of particular relevance to AKU are not among the brightest. They will face ample difficulties in maintaining economic progress and governments that inspire loyalties and confidence. And in a globalised world where the currents of mood and opinion spread nearly everywhere, one can detect international reinforcements of scepticism about any resurgence of rapid development led by many national governments.

The breakdown of confidence in the powers and benevolence of governments that began in the 1960s has persisted in the Western world, and elsewhere too, as the rise of anti-“statist”, free market doctrines show. This loss of confidence in governments was part of a wider dissatisfaction with the state of the modern world that brought the campus revolts of the late 1960s, *les évènements* in France, and similar upheavals across the world. It was an antinomian and egalitarian movement, hostile to the organisation of both modern “capitalist” and “socialist” societies. It was also, in some respects anti-scientific or anti-rational, in much the same way as the Romantic Revolt at the turn of the 19th century was a reaction against the rationalism of the Enlightenment. Max Weber saw the distinctive features of “modernity” in the secular rationalism of scientific knowledge and the predictable behaviour of specialised bureaucracies. Insofar as “modernity” can be equated with these features, the late 1960s brought a reaction against it that is still being worked out. We need not try to take a stand for or against this reaction. It clearly has contributed to the continuing gains in rights and opportunities for women and many other categories of the previously disadvantaged. It may also have made it harder to maintain social collectivities and govern them smoothly, and to have elevated individualism unduly, as Islamists and Mr. Lee Kuan Yew allege. We do not have to weigh all these important but complex changes that have marked our times. But it is important to our

purpose that we recognise that the religious movements of our time are affected by a broader cultural movement that has brought us to what many call a “Post-Modern” era.

If these conceptions are sound, we may expect persistence of the force of religious ideas, identifications and movements throughout the world over the coming decades. At the height of modern rational self-confidence there was an expectation that the force of religious identifications and ideas would gradually wither away as humanity acquired more firm control of its destiny. Such views are weakened at the present time, even though religious indifference is widespread in the industrial countries and may indeed be growing. By 2020 or 2025 there will certainly be a self-conscious Muslim world and, as we have calculated, a much larger one than at the present time. We can hardly estimate how united it may be or how militantly expressing its solidarity. There is ample evidence in the history of the politically active Islamic movements that they draw strength from populations that have been jarred out of traditional settings and exposed to the wider world through education, urbanisation and mass media. This would suggest a large potential for activism and extremism, perhaps even to rising levels over the coming decades.

The need for enlightened expression of what it means to be a Muslim in the 21st century will be correspondingly increased. The discussion here has emphasised social movements and institutions, but we must not forget the place of religion in the quest of individuals for meaningful lives. Muslims share with everyone exposed to modern life, needs to find their way through a maze of experiences. The retreat from pre-1970 confidence in secular rationality opens possibilities of intellectual and philosophical effort for AKU and other universities, Muslim and non-Muslim, that promise to be important. In a later part of this report we will say how we think this may be done. Suffice here to say, that we foresee opportunities for AKU to fulfil its vocation as a Muslim university that may balance some of the more virulent and obscurantist tendencies that have appeared in the Islamic upsurge of the last years, by emphasising more enlightened and tolerant conceptions that have been mainsprings of Islamic culture and world outlook.

<sup>8</sup> Gilles Kepel’s influential book, *La revanche de Dieu*, Paris (Seuil) 1991, has the sub-title, “*Chrétiens, juifs et musulmans à la reconquête du monde*” and centres the change around 1975.

Discussions of world trends nowadays typically begin with globalisation. We bring it in toward the end of this effort to discern what the world around AKU will be like in 2020 or 2025. Late entry here does not mean we depreciate its importance. On the contrary, we assume that globalisation affects profoundly the countries and people AKU aims to serve, and is an essential basis of its potential as an international university. We also can see it as a source of conflicts and hazards, as AKU seeks to be faithful to the constituencies His Highness listed for it in 1983.

Globalisation has a particular significance for educators because it strengthens the cosmopolitan element in the make-up of teachers and students. A modern university teaches subjects and material, notably in the sciences, that are universal in reference, and that belong to no particular national or regional culture. Also, the methods and intellectual standards by which subjects are presented transcend cultural boundaries. Much of what universities teach and practice is part of a universal or cosmopolitan culture and their students are thus educated to be citizens of the wide world. But the cosmopolitan culture that globalisation brings has, of course, many other elements that are no proper part of university education. The popular culture of blue jeans and rock music that MTV and other programmes spread by satellite to places as remote as Hunza is a notorious example. It reminds us that ordinary folk in the back of beyond can nowadays be in some measure cosmopolites.<sup>9</sup> They have other identities too, national, religious, and ethnic, and local ones rooted in their communities and kin. This simple sociological reality is often forgotten or deliberately obscured when there is insistence on some particular identity. Nationalism is a notorious and fateful source of such obscuring; it is, for example, obvious to any outsider that Pakistanis and Indians share a common South Asian culture and hence an identity; but this commonality often becomes obscured when fears and tempers rise. Similarly, the cries of militant Islam against “the West” or obversely, portentous talk about “the threat of Islam” or the coming “clash of civilisations” obscure the extent to which East and West and South share the cosmopolitan culture that belongs exclusively to no one anywhere. They also obscure the extent to which Muslims differ among themselves in their kinds of Islam and through their participation in other and different cultural traditions.

One aspect of globalisation has been the spread of the claim to a common and basic human dignity for individuals and peoples of whatever sort and everywhere. This universalism has been gnawing away at the natural and age-old human disposition to make others into lesser folk or barbarians outside the law. It is an egalitarian and individualistic disposition that has grown powerfully in the 20th century, and as the century closes it has brought forth a **multiculturalist** ideology of growing strength. As the Canadian philosopher, Charles Taylor, analyses it, multiculturalism goes beyond the egalitarian demand for equal dignity to what he calls a “politics of recognition”. Following Lionel Trilling, he finds being true to oneself, being “authentic”, a dominating modern value that lies at the basis of the modern concept of identity. Taylor writes:

*“With the politics of equal dignity, what is established is meant to be universally the same, an identical basket of rights and immunities; with the politics of difference, what we are asked to recognise is the unique identity of this individual or group, their distinctness from everyone else. The idea is that it is precisely this distinctness that has been ignored, glossed over, assimilated to a dominant or majority identity. And this assimilation is the cardinal sin against the ideal of authenticity.”* [Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition”*, Princeton, 1992, p.38.]

The importance of this “politics of recognition” in the countries of the Western world like Canada, or the United States, Belgium, or even the old centralised nations like France or Italy needs no underscoring. It has become a major element in the definition of modern democracy. And around the world it has strengthened the claims of nations and cultures to be themselves, to insist on their distinctiveness. The quarrels that have arisen over the universalism of human rights and values, or even about science, are manifestations of the rising strength of multicultural ideology.

The relevance of this new multiculturalism to the future of AKU lies positively in the chances it gives for the University to be heard as a responsible voice in the Muslim and developing worlds. Things that are said and written there will be perceived differently from similar things emanating from universities in the Western world, where there is now nervous self-examination for

<sup>9</sup> And they are relentlessly pushed that way by the ambitions of international business. The president of Coca Cola says in his 1993 report to stockholders, “... every day, every single one of the world’s 5.6 billion people will get thirsty ... only in the last few years have world events allowed us true access to more than half of those people ... As the world’s foremost beverage company, we are in the best position to satisfy their need for refreshment.” And Pepsico’s chairman promised his shareholders that their company would be chasing right along with Coca Cola after the “five billion potential customers” he saw out there.

signs of the “orientalism” Edward Said has denounced. The opportunities and advantages for AKU seem manifest, but the multicultural principles also give sanction to rival voices, some narrowly ethnic or national, some religious. “Fundamentalist” Islam certainly gains strength from the morality of multiculturalism. As an international university AKU is protected from many temptations to narrowness, while at the same time having an identity in the Muslim and developing worlds.

We do not expect globalisation to overwhelm the present strengths of multiculturalism; there are plausible arguments that it may have a reinforcing effect. And we do not see evidence of a coming reversal of the multicultural trend; we see resulting opportunities for AKU that we will set forth in this Report.

## 6 *Implications for AKU’s Future*

The various and complex changes that we have described and speculatively projected to the future have many implications for the mission of AKU in the future. As we have done at the end of the previous Section III, we here draw together some of these implications :

- The emergence of the **Central Asian republics** widens the potential domain of activity for AKU. The well-being of the Ismaili population in Tajikistan is of necessary concern to the Imam and the Jamat; there will clearly be a desire to see AKU, like other parts of AKDN, do what it can there.

- The economic decline and political difficulties in **East Africa** have cast shadows over the prospects for fruitful development of AKU that were seen there ten years ago. But the AKDN institutions there and evident needs for what AKU could contribute make some future engagements of AKU with East Africa more or less inevitable. There will be risks but appealing opportunities to be weighed in deciding if a substantial branch can be located there.

- Conditions in Pakistan and in Karachi in particular may be somewhat more difficult in 1994 than they were in 1983. The political and security prospects will need to be weighed in judgements on the location of new parts of AKU.

- Whatever the changes in the developing world and fatigue with the whole conception of development, there remain enormous populations in poverty and deprivation. The problems remain severe, difficult to analyse and resolve, and as such claiming the **continued vocation of AKU to service of the developing countries.**

- Tensions within the Muslim world and its relations with other parts of the world have increased and are unlikely to diminish in the next quarter century; coping wisely with them will require enlightened understanding of Islamic traditions and their meaning in the modern world. **Hence the potential role of AKU as a Muslim university has undoubtedly been increased and will remain important in the coming decades.**

- Globalisation in the contemporary world means that men and women must learn to reconcile their religious, ethnic, national and cosmopolitan identities. A challenge is thereby posed to AKU and other educational institutions serving the Muslim world.

- The insistence on multicultural variety now prevailing in the world offers **important opportunities to AKU as an authentic voice from the developing and Muslim world.**