4 Changes in the Muslim World
     
    The principled opposition of the activist Islamic movements to the Western world, its values and modes of personal behaviour has been one of their strongest themes. It has fed responses like Samuel Huntington's discernment of a "clash of civilisations" (a view quickly challenged by Fouad Ajami, Kishore Mahbubani and others). The antipathy of militant Islamic movements to the states in Muslim countries that were built on Western models has likewise been profound. These reactions seem related to frustrations over failures and disappointments at the benefits brought by modern secular knowledge and institutions. The decades following World War 11 were decades of enthusiasm and optimism about the possibilities of rapid development. As Francophone African leaders used to say, even very poor and backward countries aimed to "partir en fleche" ,and many governments assumed responsibility for trying to do so. Historically unprecedented progress was in fact made in most places until the early 1970s. Thereafter, there was slowing for a while followed by the differentials of successes and disappointments of the last years. For even the more successful countries, there have been disparities between expectations and accomplishments, and over much of the developing world, the performance of governments has been seen as disappointing, or worse, as corrupt and incompetent. Recourse to private initiative and organisation in many forms both secular and religious have been a natural response. Religious organisations, not only Islamic, but Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, and various syncretistic ones as well, have absorbed aspirations and assumed social functions.
     
    Retrospectively, it is easy to see reasons for the upsurge of religious movements over much of the world in the 1970s.They were not, however, clearly anticipated at the time and we may wonder how prescient we may be about their force and prevalence in 2020 or 2025. The possibility of a new era of optimistic confidence in the powers of modern secular knowledge and technology is not altogether to be excluded. But prospects of the South Asian and African countries that are of particular relevance to AKU are not among the brightest. They will face ample difficulties in maintaining economic progress and governments that inspire loyalties and confidence. And in a globalised world where the currents of mood and opinion spread nearly everywhere, one can detect international reinforcements of scepticism about any resurgence of rapid development led by many national governments.
     
    The breakdown of confidence in the powers and benevolence of governments that began in the 1960s has persisted in the Western world, and elsewhere too, as the rise of anti-"statist", free market doctrines show. This loss of confidence in ,governments was part of a wider dissatisfaction with the state of the modern world that brought the campus revolts of the late 1960s, les `ev`enements in France, and similar upheavals across the world. It was an antinomian and egalitarian movement, hostile to the organisation of both modern "capitalist" and "socialist" societies. It was also, in some respects antiscientific or anti-rational, in much the same way as the Romantic Revolt at the turn of the 19th century was a reaction against the rationalism of the Enlightenment. Max Weber saw the distinctive features of "modernity" in the secular rationalism of scientific knowledge and the predictable behaviour of specialised bureaucracies. Insofar as " modernity" can be equated with these features, the late 1960s brought a reaction against it that is still being worked out. We need not try to take a stand for or against this reaction. It clearly has contributed to the continuing gains in rights and opportunities for women and many other categories of the previously disadvantaged. It may also have made it harder to maintain social collectivities and govern them smoothly, and to have elevated individualism unduly, as Islamists and Mr. Lee Kuan Yew allege. We do not have to weigh all these important but complex changes that have marked our times. But it is important to our purpose that we recognise that the religious movements of our time are affected by a broader cultural movement that has brought us to what many call a "Post-Modern" era.
     
    If these conceptions are sound, we may expect persistence of the force of religious ideas, identifications and movements throughout the world over the coming decades. At the height of modern rational self-confidence there was an expectation that the force of religious identifications and ideas would gradually wither away as humanity acquired more firm control of its destiny. Such views are weakened at the present time, even though religious indifference is widespread in the industrial countries and may indeed be growing. By 2020 or 2025 there will certainly be a self-conscious Muslim world and, as we have calculated, a much larger one than at the present time. We can hardly estimate how united it may be or how militantly expressing its solidarity. There is ample evidence in the history of the politically active Islamic movements that they draw strength from populations that have been jarred out of traditional settings and exposed to the wider world through education, urbanisation and mass media. This would suggest a large potential for activism and extremism, perhaps even to rising levels over the coming decades.
     
    The need for enlightened expression of what it means to be a Muslim in the 21st century will be correspondingly increased. The discussion here has emphasised social movements and institutions, but we must not forget the place of religion in the quest of individuals for meaningful lives. Muslims share with everyone exposed to modern life, needs to find their way through a maze of experiences. The retreat from pre-1970 confidence in secular rationality opens possibilities of intellectual and philosophical effort for AKU and other universities, Muslim and non-Muslim, that promise to be important. In a later part of this report we will say how we think this may be done. Suffice here to say, that we foresee opportunities for AKU to fulfil its vocation as a Muslim university that may balance some of the more virulent and obscurantist tendencies that have appeared in the Islamic upsurge of the last years, by emphasising more enlightened and tolerant conceptions that have been mainsprings of Islamic culture and world outlook.

Page 1 2

[Previous] [Next]

 
[Home Page] [Preface] [Executive Summary] [Contents] [Appendix] [List Of Institutions]