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Changes in the Muslim World |
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The principled opposition of the activist Islamic movements
to the Western world, its values and modes of personal behaviour
has been one of their strongest themes. It has fed responses
like Samuel Huntington's discernment of a "clash of civilisations"
(a view quickly challenged by Fouad Ajami, Kishore Mahbubani
and others).
The antipathy of militant Islamic movements to the states in
Muslim countries that were built on Western models has likewise
been profound. These reactions seem related to frustrations
over failures and disappointments at the benefits brought by
modern secular knowledge and institutions. The decades following
World War 11 were decades of enthusiasm and optimism about the
possibilities of rapid development. As Francophone African leaders
used to say, even very poor and backward countries aimed to
"partir en fleche" ,and many governments assumed responsibility
for trying to do so. Historically unprecedented progress was
in fact made in most places until the early 1970s. Thereafter,
there was slowing for a while followed by the differentials
of successes and disappointments of the last years. For even
the more successful countries, there have been disparities between
expectations and accomplishments, and over much of the developing
world, the performance of governments has been seen as disappointing,
or worse, as corrupt and incompetent. Recourse to private initiative
and organisation in many forms both secular and religious have
been a natural response. Religious organisations, not only Islamic,
but Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, and various syncretistic ones
as well, have absorbed aspirations and assumed social functions.
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Retrospectively, it is easy to see reasons for the upsurge
of religious movements over much of the world in the 1970s. They
were not, however, clearly anticipated at the time and we may
wonder how prescient we may be about their force and prevalence
in 2020 or 2025. The possibility of a new era of optimistic
confidence in the powers of modern secular knowledge and technology
is not altogether to be excluded. But prospects of the South
Asian and African countries that are of particular relevance
to AKU are not among the brightest. They will face ample difficulties
in maintaining economic progress and governments that inspire
loyalties and confidence. And in a globalised world where the
currents of mood and opinion spread nearly everywhere, one can
detect international reinforcements of scepticism about any
resurgence of rapid development led by many national governments.
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The breakdown of confidence in the powers and benevolence
of governments that began in the 1960s has persisted in the
Western world, and elsewhere too, as the rise of anti-"statist",
free market doctrines show. This loss of confidence in ,governments
was part of a wider dissatisfaction with the state of the modern
world that brought the campus revolts of the late 1960s, les
`ev`enements in France, and similar upheavals across the world.
It was an antinomian and egalitarian movement, hostile to the
organisation of both modern "capitalist" and "socialist" societies.
It was also, in some respects antiscientific or anti-rational,
in much the same way as the Romantic Revolt at the turn of the
19th century was a reaction against the rationalism of the Enlightenment.
Max Weber saw the distinctive features of "modernity" in the
secular rationalism of scientific knowledge and the predictable
behaviour of specialised bureaucracies. Insofar as " modernity"
can be equated with these features, the late 1960s brought a
reaction against it that is still being worked out. We need
not try to take a stand for or against this reaction. It clearly
has contributed to the continuing gains in rights and opportunities
for women and many other categories of the previously disadvantaged.
It may also have made it harder to maintain social collectivities
and govern them smoothly, and to have elevated individualism
unduly, as Islamists and Mr. Lee Kuan Yew allege. We do not
have to weigh all these important but complex changes that have
marked our times. But it is important to our purpose that we
recognise that the religious movements of our time are affected
by a broader cultural movement that has brought us to what many
call a "Post-Modern" era. |
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If these conceptions are sound, we may expect persistence
of the force of religious ideas, identifications and movements
throughout the world over the coming decades. At the height
of modern rational self-confidence there was an expectation
that the force of religious identifications and ideas would
gradually wither away as humanity acquired more firm control
of its destiny. Such views are weakened at the present time,
even though religious indifference is widespread in the industrial
countries and may indeed be growing. By 2020 or 2025 there will
certainly be a self-conscious Muslim world and, as we have calculated,
a much larger one than at the present time. We can hardly estimate
how united it may be or how militantly expressing its solidarity.
There is ample evidence in the history of the politically active
Islamic movements that they draw strength from populations that
have been jarred out of traditional settings and exposed to
the wider world through education, urbanisation and mass media.
This would suggest a large potential for activism and extremism,
perhaps even to rising levels over the coming decades. |
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The need for enlightened expression of what it means to be
a Muslim in the 21st century will be correspondingly increased.
The discussion here has emphasised social movements and institutions,
but we must not forget the place of religion in the quest of
individuals for meaningful lives. Muslims share with everyone
exposed to modern life, needs to find their way through a maze
of experiences. The retreat from pre-1970 confidence in secular
rationality opens possibilities of intellectual and philosophical
effort for AKU and other universities, Muslim and non-Muslim,
that promise to be important. In a later part of this report
we will say how we think this may be done. Suffice here to say,
that we foresee opportunities for AKU to fulfil its vocation
as a Muslim university that may balance some of the more virulent
and obscurantist tendencies that have appeared in the Islamic
upsurge of the last years, by emphasising more enlightened and
tolerant conceptions that have been mainsprings of Islamic culture
and world outlook. |
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